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COLORISM AND THE LAW IN LATIN 
AMERICA—GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
COLORISM CONFERENCE REMARKS 
TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ

  
There are approximately 150 million people of African descent in Latin 
America, which represents about 1/3 of the total population.1 This density 
of Afro-descendants is the result of the slave trade that brought an 
estimated 10.7 million African slaves. This represents 65 percent of all 
African slaves brought to Latin America in comparison to the 388,000 to 
450,000 African slaves (or 6 percent) brought to the United States.2 “Yet, 
these are considered conservative demographic figures given the historical 
undercounting of persons of African descent in Latin American national 
censuses, and often completely omitting a racial/ethnic origin census 
question.”3 Today, persons of African descent make up more than forty 
percent of the poor in Latin America and have been consistently 
marginalized and denigrated as undesirable elements of the society since 
the abolition of slavery across the Americas.4  
 However, Latin Americans still very much adhere to the notion that, 
because racial mixture and the absence of Jim-Crow racial segregation are 
such a marked contrast to the United States’ racial history, the region is 
what I term “racially innocent” and thus resistant to proposals that 
institutions use public policies of inclusion to address the entrenched racial 
disparities.
5
 This resistance exists despite the fact that a recent study 
empirically demonstrates the exclusionary effects of Latin American 
pigmentocracies.6  
 
 
  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (THernandez@law.fordham.edu).  
 1. MARGARITA SÁNCHEZ AND MAURICE BRYAN, PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT, 
DISCRIMINATION AND ECONOMIC EXCLUSION IN LATIN AMERICA 3–4, tbl.1 (2003), available at 
http://www.minorityrights.org/933/macro-studies/afrodescendants-discrimination-and-economic-
exclusion-in-latin-america.html.  
 2. EMORY UNIVERSITY, TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE DATABASE, http://www.slave 
voyages.org/tast/index.faces (last visited July 18, 2015). 
 3. Juliet Hooker, Afro-Descendant Struggles for Collective Rights in Latin America: Between 
Race and Culture, 10 SOULS 279, 281 (2008). 
 4. GUSTAVO MÁRQUEZ ET AL., OUTSIDERS? THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF EXCLUSION IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 15–17 (2007).  
 5. TANYA KATERI HERNANDEZ, RACIAL SUBORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF 
THE STATE, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSE 2 (2013). 
 6. The term “pigmentocracy” was coined by Chilean anthropologist Alejandro Lipschutz to 
refer to the ethnic and color-based hierarchies of Latin America. Specifically, a pigmentocracy is a 
hierarchy based upon a color continuum that can also appear as an ethnoracial hierarchy with Whites 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:683 
 
 
 
 
Princeton University’s Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America 
(PERLA) surveyed four large Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Columbia, Mexico, and Peru), which together represent about sixty-five 
percent of Latin America’s population along with many of its indigenous 
and Afro-descended peoples.
7
 PERLA’s central conclusion is that skin 
color is a central axis of social stratification.8 Particularly noteworthy was 
PERLA’s ability to study skin color inequality in depth by not only using 
the traditional survey method of direct questions about racial attitudes but 
also using a skin color palette (i.e. a chart of skin color gradations) for 
interviewers to record each respondent’s skin shade.9 The color palette 
allowed researchers to statistically document the salience of skin color and 
its effect on the study’s results. The use of a color palette may strike some 
people as an outrageous reification of skin color differences, but the study 
persuasively shows that race and ethnicity are not simply a matter of 
identity or consciousness.10 Rather, race and ethnicity also involve the 
gaze of the “other” in ways that indicate skin color measures capture racial 
inequalities that solitary racial categories often miss. This is because racial 
fluidity in Latin America is based upon the premise that racial 
classifications are determined more closely by how one phenotypically 
appears to belong to one race rather than strictly by one’s ancestors.
11
 For 
instance, before a racial designation of Black or “Negro” is deemed 
appropriate, custom dictates an informal visual assessment of an 
individual’s hair texture, nose width, thickness of lips, and degree of dark 
pigmentation for consistency with what is stereotypically viewed as a 
Black person.
12
 Accordingly, individuals with identical racial heritage can 
be identified socially or informally by distinct racial designations based on 
their phenotype. 
To a certain extent, Latin American racial category practices also 
permit economic and social status to mediate the determination of racial 
 
 
on the top, mestizos/mulattoes in the middle and Black and indigenous people at the bottom. 
ALEJANDRO LIPSCHUTZ, INDOAMERICANISMO Y EL PROBLEMA RACIAL EN LAS AMERICAS 254 (1944). 
 7. EDWARD TELLES, PIGMENTOCRACIES: ETHNICITY, RACE AND COLOR IN LATIN AMERICA 5 
(2014). 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. Id. at 11–13. “We thus created a color palette, which interviewers used to rate the facial skin 
tone of respondents. Thus we created a variable denoting skin color as observed by the interviewer 
using an actual color palette; that allowed us to reasonably fix skin tone . . . . We also trained the 
interviewers in all four countries using a uniform training manual.” Id. at 11–12. 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. See MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 57 (1964). 
 12. Id. at 57–58 (detailing anthropological accounting of at least 40 different racial terms to 
identify people with some African ancestry depending on color and phenotype variations). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/12
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classification. As a result, dark-skinned Afro-descendants with higher 
socioeconomic standing have more leeway in selecting a racial 
classification, which invokes greater Whiteness than more impoverished 
individuals with the same skin-color.
13
 The interplay between social class 
and racial classification is rooted in the Brazilian “branqueamento” (and 
Latin American/Caribbean “blanqueamiento”) White ideal that continues 
to be central to Brazilian and Latin American/Caribbean race ideology.
14
 
“Branqueamento,” which means “Whitening,” refers to both the aspiration 
and possibility of transforming one’s social status by approaching 
Whiteness. An individual can become socially lighter by marrying a 
lighter-skinned partner or by becoming wealthy or famous. For instance, it 
is consistently alleged that the dark-skinned soccer icon from Brazil, Pelé, 
successfully deployed the branqueamento ideology when he had his birth 
certificate amended to reflect a White racial classification after achieving 
world fame.
15
 
In concert with the branqueamento approach to racial identification, 
the Latin American/Caribbean race model advances the cultural practice 
known as “mestiçagem,” which asserts that race mixture has made racial 
identification a very indeterminate and unnecessary practice.
16
 In turn, 
racial mixture is rhetorically idealized and promoted as the national norm. 
However, the national representation of racial mixture that is preferred is 
closer to light rather than to dark, and individuals are overtly discouraged 
from identifying along racial lines in order to maintain the national myth 
of racial democracy.
17
 
 
 
 13. See Peggy A. Lovell, Race, Gender, and Development in Brazil, 3 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 7, 
13 (1994). 
 14. See Edith Piza, Branco No Brasil? Ninguem Sabe, Ninguem Viu . . ., in TIRANDO A 
MASCARA: ENSAIOS SOBRE O RACISMO NO BRASIL 97, 103 (Antonio Sergio Alfredo Guimaraes & 
Lynn Huntley eds., 2000) (discussing the whitening ideal in Brazil). See also Arlene Torres & Norman 
E. Whitten, Jr., To Forge the Future in the Fires of the Past: An Interpretive Essay on Racism, 
Domination, Resistance, and Liberation, Introduction to BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 3, 8–9 (1998) (“‘Blanqueamiento’ [in Latin America and the Caribbean] refers to the 
processes of becoming increasingly acceptable to those classified and self-identified as ‘White.’ This 
is an ethnic movement–conterminous with socioeconomic advancement governed by the ideology of 
development . . . .”).  
 15. See Telephone Interview with Anani Dzidzienyo, Professor of Afro-Brazilian Studies, Brown 
University, Africana Studies Department and Portuguese & Brazilian Studies Department (Feb. 20, 
2002) (explaining that Brazilians so frequently set forth Pelé as the proof that “money Whitens” that it 
is also thought that Pelé altered his official racial classification on his identity documents). 
 16. See Torres & Whitten, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
 17. See Rebecca Reichaman, Introduction in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL: FROM 
INDIFFERENCE TO INEQUALITY 1, 2–7 (Rebecca Reichmann ed., 1999) (describing the Brazilian racial 
democracy myth that denies the existence of racism and stifles racial debates and mobilization). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
686 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:683 
 
 
 
 
 In those Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, where sizable communities of Blacks 
reside
18
 and where Whites are a numerical minority, a favored light skin 
class called “Mulatto”
19
 has long been recognized as distinct from the 
subordinate dark-skin population.
20
 The late historian Carl Degler termed 
this phenomenon as the “mulatto escape hatch,” which he defined as the 
“recognition of a special place for mixed bloods.”
21
 Mulattoes are 
accorded greater favors than Blacks, but fewer privileges than the 
numerical minority of empowered Whites: “The top jobs in business, 
politics and academia are held by those with light skin . . . . Studies show 
that Blacks are poorer, less educated and less respected than Whites and 
Mulattoes.”
22
 This is facilitated by employment practices of asking for 
photographs with resumes and posting job announcements where “good 
appearance” is an understood code for light appearance, which is often 
included as a job requirement. In turn, the greater opportunities available 
 
 
 18. This is in contrast to those Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador, 
where indigenous persons are a majority of the population of color and persons of African ancestry are 
fewer in number. Yet, it should also be noted that the Black minorities in such countries are also 
denigrated. See LESLIE B. ROUT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA: 1502 TO THE 
PRESENT DAY 185–226 (1977) (examining the Black experience in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador); Calvin Sims, “For Blacks in Peru, There’s No Room at the Top,” 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (describing Peruvian 
Blacks’ discontent with their menial jobs). 
 19. Although the use of the word “Mulatto” to describe mixed-race persons has a derogative 
etymology, it is used in this Article to reflect accurately the terminology used for mixed-race persons 
in Latin America and in the United States during certain historical periods to be discussed herein. See 
JACK D. FORBES, BLACK AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS 131–50 (1988) (explaining that the word 
“Mulatto” became equivalent to the word “hybrid” in the sixteenth century and that “Mulatto” 
historically implied such traits as immorality, inferior physical status, and subservience commonly 
associated with mules as laboring animals). 
 20. Although the Mulatto racial class is distinct in much of Latin America, most scholarship has 
concentrated on the case example of Brazil, which has the largest Black population outside of the 
African continent. Sabrina Gledhill, The Latin Model of Race Relations, in CARLOS MOORE, CASTRO, 
THE BLACKS, AND AFRICA app. 1, at 355 (1988) (explaining that the Latin American model of race 
relations is structured upon recognition of a Mulatto class and the premise that miscegenation will 
solve racial problems); cf. Lovell, supra note 13, at 7 (“Brazil is home to the world’s largest 
population of African descent except for Nigeria.”); David L. Marcus, Melting Pot Coming To A Boil: 
Brazilians Blur Color Lines, but Racism Stands out Clearly,” DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1994, 
at 1A, available at 1994 WL 6103958 (reporting that about half of Brazil’s population is comprised of 
people with African blood). 
 21. CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL 
AND THE UNITED STATES 103, 245 (1971) (discussing the gradations of color and the higher ranking of 
value attached to those closest to White in the creation of a Mulatto Escape Hatch). 
 22. See generally Marcus, supra note 20. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/12
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to Mulattoes encourage them to dissociate themselves from their African 
ancestry.
23
  
This dynamic is not a social artifact divorced from the role of law. 
Light skin preferences were historically manifested in actual government 
policy in ways that have powerfully shaped the structure and maintenance 
of race-based hierarchies informed by skin-color. A useful case study is 
that of Brazil—the Latin American nation with the greatest number of 
Afro-descendants. In Brazil, the government used its immigration laws to 
exclude Afro-descended workers from the formal labor market and 
thereby insulate light-skin privilege. The first step in the Brazilian national 
Whitening campaign was legislating restrictive immigration laws 
designed, first, to encourage European immigration and, second, to 
prohibit or severely discourage the immigration of peoples of African, 
Asian, and Indigenous ancestry. As early as the 1850s, with the growing 
international pressure to disengage from the slave trade and abolish 
slavery completely, the legislature took decisive steps to encourage 
European immigration.24 For example, a statute passed that year provided 
generous land grants to European immigrants.25 That same statute denied 
land title to residents of quilombos–(land that had been occupied by the 
descendants of runaway slaves for generations). The provincial 
government of São Paulo then heavily funded the Society for the 
Promotion of Immigration.26 
After the final emancipation of slaves in 1888, and the dissolution of 
the Brazilian Empire in 1889, the legal preference for White immigrants 
would become more overt because of the distaste Brazilian elites had for 
the vision of Afro-descended peoples as paid laborers.27 Indeed, in official 
gatherings of the slaveholders anticipating the end of slavery, meeting 
 
 
 23. See id. (“[D]ark-skinned Brazilians are reluctant to call themselves Black. To [sic.] many 
Blacks the goal is to be ‘promoted’ out of being Black, to join the mainstream.”); cf. Anthony W. 
Marx, Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial Identity and Social Movements, reprinted in 
Supp. 3 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOC. HISTORY, CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY 
159, 177–79 (Charles Tilly ed., 1996) (maintaining that the Brazilian state’s propagation of an image 
of racially inclusive citizenship hinders racial identity formation for social mobilization despite the 
existence of inequality). 
 24. KIM D. BUTLER, FREEDOMS GIVEN, FREEDOMS WON: AFRO-BRAZILIANS IN POST-
ABOLITION SÃO PAULO AND SALVADOR 26–27 (1998).  
 25. EUNICE APARECIDA DE JESUS PRUDENTE, PRECONCEITO RACIAL E IGUALDADE JURIDICA NO 
BRASIL 129–31 (1989).  
 26. Thomas P. Holloway, Immigration and Abolition: The Transition from Slave to Free Labor, 
in the São Paulo Coffee Zone, in ESSAYS CONCERNING THE SOCIOECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRAZIL AND 
PORTUGUESE INDIA 163 (Dauril Alden and Warren Dean eds., 1977) (2013). 
 27. CECILIA MARIA MARINHO DE AZEVEDO, ONDA NEGRA, MEDO BRANCO: O NEGRO NO 
IMAGINÁRIO DAS ELITES SÉCULO XIX 252 (1987).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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minutes recorded the preference for White immigrants over the 
“indolence” of the native population then laboring in servitude as a 
“decrepit race.”28 Understanding the preference for European immigrants 
as racially motivated is especially clear when one observes that the 
Europeans recruited were not skilled laborers, and many were illiterate 
rural dwellers.29 Moreover, during the post-emancipation period, when 
European immigrants were being sought, the wage labor positions 
available were for low-skilled laborers without education or professional 
training that could have been easily filled by the newly emancipated 
Brazilians had they not been viewed as racially “unfit” for wage labor.30 
Indeed, newspaper classified advertisements explicitly stated, “WHITES 
preferred.”31 These racialized attitudes about the ability to work in wage 
labor were then reflected in regional legislative assemblies, such as that of 
São Paulo in 1888 where the desirability of White foreign workers was 
discussed along with the proposal to provide land grants to encourage their 
immigration.32 
Accordingly, one of the first enactments of the new republic was 
Immigration Decree No. 528 promulgated on June 28, 1890, by the 
provisional president, Manoel Deodoro da Foneseca.33 His decree 
excluded all members of the indigenous populations of Asia and Africa 
from immigrating to Brazil. This was at a time when overall immigration 
was at its height and immigrants from other continents like Europe were 
allowed entry without a fee. In 1921, the Brazilian Congress passed a 
similar law, which specifically prohibited Black immigrants from entering 
Brazil.34 When Blacks sought to do so, they were simply denied visas.35 
This preceded the U.S. National Origins Quota Immigration Act of 1924, 
which explicitly based U.S. immigration on racial and ethnic origin. 
However, one of the decree provisions was relaxed two years later, when a 
statute passed in October 1892 permitted the entry of Chinese and 
 
 
 28. CONGRESSO AGRÍCOLA DO RIO DE JANEIRO 155–59 (1878). 
 29. PETRÔNIO DOMINGUES, UMA HISTÓRIA NÃO CONTADA: NEGRO, RACISMO, E 
BRANQUEAMENTO EM SÃO PAULO PÓS-ABOLIÇÃO 89–91 (2004).  
 30. LÚCIO KOWARICK, TRABALHO E VADIAGEM: A ORIGEM DO TRABALHO LIVRE NO BRASIL 
118 (1987). 
 31. DOMINGUES, supra note 29, at 109–10. 
 32. Relatório apresentado à Assembléia Legislativa Provincial de São Paulo pelo presidente da 
Província Exmo. Sr. Dr. Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves, no dia 10 de janeiro de 1888 (São Paulo: 
Tipografia a vapor de Jorge Seckler & Comp., 1888), at 32. 
 33. PRUDENTE, supra note 25, at 151–52. 
 34. Decree No. 4247, art. 5, de 6 janeiro 1921, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
 35. TERESA A. MEADE, “CIVILIZING” RIO: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN A BRAZILIAN CITY, 
1889–1930, at 31 (1996). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/12
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Japanese immigrants.36 Large waves of immigration in Brazil coincided 
with the abolition of slavery in 1888, making European immigration a 
national policy by the late nineteenth century with migrant numbers only 
exceeded by Argentina.37 In fact, in 1889 Brazil enacted a law to grant 
automatic naturalization to the immigrants who migrated from Europe.38 
Furthermore, the government expended funds to encourage European 
immigration with the payment of transportation costs. The Brazilian 
national government paid these European transportation costs to Brazil 
from 1851 to 1909 and then by the São Paulo province (and later state) 
from 1881 to 1927.39 São Paulo administrative law also provided for state 
funded housing where food and hospital care would be supplied,40 along 
with a cash grant that varied by the age of the European immigrant.41 São 
Paulo state-funded immigration expenditures also included pro-
immigration lobbying in European countries, farming tools, and the waiver 
of military service for the children of immigrants.42 In 1888, just months 
before the final emancipation of the slaves, the São Paulo Provincial 
Assembly authorized the government to allocate this plethora of 
immigration subsidies to a minimum of 100,000 immigrants.43 The 
dedication of governmental funds to the Whitening project of European 
immigration was so significant that by 1895 immigration subsidies took up 
14.5 percent of São Paulo’s annual budget, 10 percent of its 1896 budget, 
and 10.8 percent of its 1901 budget.44 
While the floodgates were opened for European immigrants, the 
continued ban on immigrants from the continent of Africa was broadly 
interpreted so as to exclude U.S. tourists of African descent who had never 
set foot in Africa let alone had citizenship status in a country on the 
African continent. Furthermore, the Brazilian government continued to 
exclude U.S. citizens of African descent despite its flagrant breach of the 
 
 
 36. PRUDENTE, supra note 25, at 153–54. 
 37. Mary Elizabeth Bletz, Whiteness of a Darker Color: Narratives of Immigration and 
Culturation in Brazil and Argentina, 1890–1930, at 22–23, 30 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
New York University) (on file with the author). 
 38. Id. at 157–58. 
 39. Regulamento para o Serviço de Imigração da Província de São Paulo (São Paulo: Tipografia 
do Correio Paulistano, 1887), art. 17, at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. DOMINGUES, supra note 29, at 69. 
 43. TELÉSFORO DE SOUSA LOBO, SÃO PAULO NA FEDERAÇÃO: PROBLEMAS SOCIAIS, QUESTÕES 
RACIAS, POLÍTICA IMIGRANTISTA E ESTUDOS ECONÓMICOS 219 (1924). 
 44. Boletim da Diretoria de Terras, Colonização e Imigração, no. 1, São Paulo, 1941, at 6–22. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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1828 Peace, Friendship, Trade, and Navigation Agreement between Brazil 
and the United States. This treaty stated: 
The citizens and subjects of both countries may travel 
throughout the other, with right to reside and do business. . . . There 
will be a perfect, fixed, and inviolable peace and friendship between 
[the United States and Brazil] in all their possessions and territories 
. . . without distinction of people and places.45 
The racial restriction on Brazilian immigration law continued with the 
government of Getúlio Vargas (1930–45). In 1934, his new constitution 
would effectively limit immigration to Whites.46 This was done by 
capping the annual number of immigrants to 2 percent of those of each 
national origin who had arrived in Brazil within the last fifty years. 
Because Africans were not allowed to immigrate to Brazil in the prior fifty 
years, the 2 percent annual quota effectively prohibited all African 
immigration without ever having to be racially specific in its 
terminology.47 The Brazilian Constitution also went on to effectively 
prohibit settlements by Blacks or Asians regardless of their country of 
origin, by forbidding a concentration of immigrants anywhere in the 
country that would conflict with the law to regulate the selection of 
immigrants and their assimilation.48 This measure was presumably 
designed to curtail their immigration from other Latin American nations.49 
Provisions in the Brazilian Constitution designed to allow the government 
to prevent non-White immigrants from entering the country were 
reenacted in the 1946 Constitution and in a 1969 decree by the military 
government.50 
With the overt racialization of the immigration policy, Brazilian 
legislators and elite stakeholders were quite explicit about the desire to use 
immigration to eradicate Blacks. Like Spanish America’s blanqueamiento 
Whitening projects, Brazilian White immigration was rooted in eugenics 
discourse that reinforced preexisting Brazilian beliefs about the inferiority 
 
 
 45. Jeffrey Lesser, Immigration and Shifting Concepts of National Identity in Brazil during the 
Vargas Era, 31 LUSO-BRAZ. REV. 23–44 (1994). 
 46. PRUDENTE, supra note 25, at 155–56. 
 47. Constitução da República Dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 16 julio de 1934, art. 121, para. 6. 
 48. Id. para. 7. 
 49. Prudente, supra note 25, at 155–56. 
 50. Constitução da República Dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 18 septembro de 1946, art. 162. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/12
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of Africans and their eventual extinction.51 For instance, in 1879, 
parliament member Joaquim Nabuco stated: 
[A]s the Black man and the White live together in the same 
society for hundreds of years, the former’s blood will tend to be 
absorbed into that of the latter, or it will disappear altogether as the 
one race gives up the field to the other, better prepared for the 
struggle of life.52 
The Brazilian branqueamento immigration project was so successful 
that in less than a century of subsidized European immigration, Brazil 
imported more free White laborers than Black slaves imported in three 
centuries of the slave trade (4,793,981 immigrants arrived from 1851 
to1937 compared to the 3.6 million slaves forcibly imported).53 In São 
Paulo, where European immigration was the most intense, the population 
of African descent (Mulato and Negro counted together) decreased from 
47 percent in both 1811 and 1836 to 16 percent by 1928.54 
While Blacks were not completely eradicated from the entire Brazilian 
population, the branqueamento immigration policy was successful to the 
extent that newly freed slaves and their descendants were purposely 
displaced from the labor market by the importation of European 
immigrants. No support or social guarantees of any kind were provided to 
former slaves to help them enter the free labor system after their release. It 
is true that the northeastern state of Bahia did enact a color-blind 
distributive land law in 1897 that could theoretically enable post-abolition 
Afro-Brazilians and others to garner legal title to small parcels of 
farmland, but freed slaves encountered many obstacles that hindered their 
ability to obtain such titles in great numbers.55 
Furthermore, Afro-Brazilians were systematically excluded from the 
labor market. For instance, the post-emancipation naval services were well 
known for excluding Afro-Brazilians from the rank of officer to such an 
extent that the popular press commonly referred to Whiteness as a 
prerequisite. The newspapers from 1910 to 1923 are replete with accounts 
 
 
 51. Sales Augusto dos Santos & Laurence Hallewell, Historical Roots of the ‘Whitening’ of 
Brazil, 29 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2002). 
 52. Joaquim Nabuco, Discursos Parlamentares (Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Centro de 
Documentação e Informação, Coordenação de Publicações, 1983), at 82. 
 53. Dos Santos & Hallewell, supra note 51, at 70. 
 54. Samuel Lowrie, O elemento negro na população de São Paulo, 48 Revista do Arquivo 
Municipal 12 (1938). 
 55. Mary Ann Mahony, Afro-Brazilians, Land Reform, and the Question of Social Mobility in 
Southern Bahia, 1880–1920, in AFRO-BRAZILIAN CULTURE AND POLITICS: BAHIA, 1790’S TO 1990’S, 
90–116 (Hendrik Kraay ed., 1998). 
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of the military service preference for candidates who were “as White as 
possible.”56 
Similarly, in a 1928 São Paulo legislative session, which discussed the 
eventual 1928 enactment of a law to lift the prohibition against the entry of 
Afro-Brazilians to the local police force, it was noted that Afro-Brazilians 
were prohibited from employment as prison guards and military police.57 
And even with the 1928 legally mandated prohibition against the 
exclusion of Afro-Brazilians from the local police force, Whiteness was 
still included as an official requirement for applicants in solicitation 
documents.58 Afro-Brazilians were only nominally able to enter the São 
Paulo police force after 1932. 
In an 1894 listing of occupations after abolition in São Paulo, where 
more than 50 percent of the immigrants settled, foreigners represented 
82.5 percent of workers in occupations essential to rapid urban expansion 
and industrialization (e.g. manufacturing, crafts, transport, commerce) 
while Blacks were relegated to domestic sphere employment. In São Paulo 
alone, 71.2 percent of the workers at that time were foreigners.59 
Furthermore, in rural locations able to attract sufficient immigrant 
workers, these workers too were preferred to emancipated slaves resulting 
in their displacement as free laborers. Indeed, the Minister of Agriculture 
Antonio Prado proposed measures to promote the establishment of 
immigrants in agriculture.60 The preference for White immigrants is also 
demonstrated in Sam Adamo’s study of Rio de Janeiro employment 
practices of the 1930s.61 Adamo found that lower-skilled White 
immigrants were preferred to better-educated Afro-descendants even 
though the Afro-descendants were typically paid less.  
 
 
 56. Álvaro Pereirado Nascimento, Um Reduto Negro: Cor e Cidadania na Armada (1870–1910), 
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CONCLUSION 
In short, the examination of historical instances of state sponsored 
Whitening in Brazil demonstrate that the Brazilian government was just as 
involved in regulating race as was that of the United States during Jim 
Crow segregation. Furthermore Brazil was not alone in its governmental 
attempts to Whiten populations in Latin America.
62
 The construction of 
skin-shade obsessed citizens in Latin America was not an instinctive 
process—it entailed the direct actions of nation-states. And as such, the 
contemporary Afro-descendant demand for remediation of the legacy of 
slavery and racial exclusion within its pigmentocracies63 can find 
additional support in referencing the troubled role of the state in the legal 
regulation of race that I have just briefly described here and elaborate upon 
more in my book “Racial Subordination in Latin America.”
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 62. See generally HERNANDEZ, supra note 5. 
 63. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
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